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Abstract: The paper aims to analyse and compare the interpretative function 
of legislative history in the judicial activity of the European Court of Justice 
and Polish courts.  
The authors have analysed judgments of the respective courts, focusing on the 
role of legislative history in their argumentation. In the Polish and European 
doctrine, the usefulness of travaux preparatoires has been underestimated. 
Nevertheless, legislative history may provide arguments important in judicial 
reasoning both in uni- and multilingual legal systems. However, its 
importance and functions in Polish and European cases examined herein are 
different. The research conducted enables a better understanding of the 
interpretative value of legislative history in legal interpretation and can result 
in more frequent use of this tool in the judicial activity of national and 
European courts. 
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„HISTORIA LEGIS LACYJNA” JAKO NARZĘDZIE WYKŁADN I 
JEDNO I WIELOJĘZYKOWYCH SYSTEMÓW PRAWNYCH (NA 
PRZYKŁADZIE POLSKI I EU) 
 
Abstrakt: Celem pracy jest analiza i porównanie interpretacyjnego znaczenia 
historii legislacyjnej w działalności orzeczniczej Europejskiego Trybunału 
Sprawiedliwości i sądów polskich. 
Autorki analizują orzeczenia sądów, koncentrując się na roli historii 
legislacyjnej w używanej przez sądy argumentacji. W doktrynie polskiej i 
europejskiej użyteczność travaux preparatoires nie jest dostatecznie 
doceniana. Niemniej jednak historia legislacyjna może dostarczyć w procesie 
wykładni tekstu prawnego istotnych argumentów i to zarówno w 
jednojęzycznych, jak i wielojęzycznych systemach prawnych. Jednak jej 
znaczenie i funkcje w obu badanych jurysdykcjach są odmienne. 
Przeprowadzone badania pozwalają na lepsze zrozumienie wartości 
interpretacyjnej materiałów legislacyjnych w interpretacji prawniczej i mogą 
przyczynić się do zwiększenia użyć tego narzędzia w działalności sądowej 
sądów krajowych i europejskich. 
 
Słowa klucze: historia legislacyjna, wykładnia prawa, wielojęzyczność prawa  
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1. What is legislative history? Several remarks on its 
position in legal interpretation around the world, 
including arguments in favour of and against legislative 
history usage1 
The legal interpretive discourse offers tools which are significant in 
some of the legal systems and are at the same time undervalued in 
others. An excellent corroboration of this thesis can be found in 
legislative materials, a set of documents drawn up in the process of 
creating a piece of legislation, making up the so-called legislative 
history of a piece of legislation. Legislative materials, treated as a 
potential tool in the interpretation of the law, have arguably been one 
of the most discussed issues in worldwide legal theory over the past few 
years. The discussion on ways of using legislative materials and the role 
they play or should play in the interpretation of the law is taking place 
in numerous countries across Europe (Germany, Sweden, Great Britain, 
France, Spain), but also outside the European culture (in the United 
States, which not only started this discussion, but in fact continues to 
keep it on a very high level, as well as in Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, or Asian countries)2. The ongoing debate, which involves not 
just interpreters, but also the legislatures3, is a trigger for discussions on 
the value of legislative materials for interpretation of the law. 
Legislative materials (also referred to as preparatory materials or 
travaux preparatoires) usually appear in the context of interpretation of 
the law under the name legislative history. The term was coined in 
English language literature, where its use is widespread4. 
Conventionally understood, legislative history is a set of materials – 
drawn up in the form of documents – produced by the legislator or 
                                                                 
1 Project financed by the Polish National Science Centre under grant no. DEC-
2011/03/D/HS5/02493.  
2 I discuss this in more detail in monograph A. Bielska – Brodziak, Śladami 
prawodawcy faktycznego. Materiały legislacyjne jako narzędzie wykładni, Warsaw 
2017. 
3 See e.g. a comprehensive and detailed study conducted in the legislative circles, 
described in a two-part work by A. R. Gluck, L. S. Bressman (2013: 901-1025 and 
2014: 725-801). 
4 Legislative history is a highly popular term in English language literature – cf. e.g 
Popkin 2007: 160–183; also Eskridge Jr, Frickey and Garrett 2006: 303. 
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commissioned by the legislator in the course of drafting and passing of 
a piece of legislation, with documents deriving from the parliamentary 
stage of the law-making process being the most important for the 
process of interpretation of the law. Legislative history is used in the 
process of interpretation with the interpreter accessing draft acts, 
explanatory statements, or parliamentary debate records in order to 
develop, accept, or reject interpretative hypotheses.  
2. Poland  
2.1. Types of legislative materials and the evolution of 
their value resulting from improved access to legislative 
history (the Internet) 
Legislative materials can be divided into three categories, reflecting the 
stages of the law-making process: materials created before submitting 
the draft legislation to the parliament, materials created during the 
parliamentary phase, and presidential veto (which is rarely and 
marginally important for the interpretation process). Materials of the 
pre-parliamentary phase (naturally, with the exception of the draft itself 
and the explanatory statement) have so far had rather limited 
significance for interpretation, which is not to say that it should be like 
that. Especially in case of drafts authored by the government, the 
knowledge of legislative circumstances that emerged during the work 
on the draft can be invaluable for the interpretation process. The use of 
legislative materials generated before the draft had been referred to the 
parliament, ought to increase not just because the information included 
therein is useful, but also because it is readily available.  
Some of the most useful and most frequently used legislative 
materials are documents drawn up in the course of work of the Sejm 
and Senate, namely: 
1. explanatory statements to bills 
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2. amendments submitted in the course of the legislative works 
(both those which resulted in modification of the draft and those which 
were rejected) by the Sejm and Senate committees 
3. committee and subcommittee reports being updated versions 
of the bill (approved by vote in the various stages of the subsequent 
stages of the legislative procedure) 
4. stenographic records of debates held as part of committee or 
subcommittee works, or as part of plenary sessions of the legislative 
body 
 5. opinions on the draft.  
All these materials are currently readily available for 
interpreters in the public space. More detailed issues, important for the 
interpreter and related to the various types of legislative materials, will 
not be discussed herein given the assumed framework of this article5. 
It must be emphasised that over the past few years the 
conditions of using legislative materials have significantly improved 
due to free, relatively easy, and convenient access via the Internet. 
Poland currently has several official databases which offer on-line 
access to legislative materials.  
 
2.2. Ways of using legislative materials in decisions of 
Polish courts 
Two areas should be distinguished here. The first one is reasons for 
using legislative history in the process of interpretation (what is the 
interpreter trying to find?), whereas the second one is specific 
interpretation situations (interpretation problems), wherein legislative 
materials prove useful (what problem is the interpreter trying to solve?).  
 
                                                                 
5 I have discussed these in my monograph (Bielska-Brodziak, 2017) so I encourage the 
Readers to refer to the book.  
 
 
Agnieszka Bielska-Brodziak, Karolina Paluszek: Legislative history... 
12 
 
2.3.1. Reasons for using legislative materials in 
interpretation of the law (what are we trying to find?) 
Regardless of what problem the interpreter is working on, the legislative 
history can be used either to find information on the legislator's 
objective or on the meaning (of a particular word/phrase used in the 
wording of a provision of the law)6. In the first case, explanatory 
statements to bills will mostly be used, as this type of documents 
includes an explanation of the motives behind the legislator's law-
making activity. It is worth noting that determination of the objective is 
the prevailing reason for referring to legislative materials in decision-
making practice. Using legislative history in this way also appears to be 
in accordance with the legal intuition: analysis of the comprehensive 
background for a bill and conditions of the debate that precedes its entry 
into force, all of which can be extracted from legislative history, offers 
an opportunity to understand the context behind the legislator's activity 
and the objectives of the actual legislator (Breyer 1992: 848). 
On the other hand, legislative materials can also be used as a 
dictionary, which the interpreter uses to look up the meaning of a certain 
word or phrase used in an act. Identification of the meaning of a specific 
word or phrase calls for using different types of parliamentary 
documents. In this case, the best way to obtain information is through 
the observation of changes in a provision of the law resulting from 
amendments adopted, and through an analysis of amendments rejected 
(which, in turn, reveal what the legislator did not want). This will 
involve both draft modifications implemented through amendments 
(elimination of certain wording, introduction of other modifications to 
the existing wording of the draft), as well as explanatory statements to 
the amendments. Moreover, information can be found in opinions on 
the draft, including the reaction of the Sejm bodies to these opinions 
(whether they have been taken into account or ignored). It is worth 
adding that when looking for information on the meaning of a particular 
word of expression used by the legislator, a single legislative material 
                                                                 
6 Numerous publications in the English language highlight the two aforementioned 
reasons for using legislative materials. See e.g. Nourse (2014: 1644); Jellum (2008: 
169). Similar distinctions are made in the German literature – see Übelacker (1993: 14–
17). 
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is seldom used. Instead, interpreters usually carry out more 
comprehensive analyses of numerous documents. 
 
2.3.2. Problems (interpretation situations) solved with 
the help of legislative history 
The second sphere in which legislative history is used for interpretation 
purposes is connected with its usefulness for solving specific situations 
or interpretation problems (ambiguity, vagueness, silence on the part of 
the legislator, etc.). Legislative materials are used in interpretation of 
the law in five interpretation situations: choosing from among several 
interpretation hypotheses, confirming a specific interpretation, 
supplementing the meaning of the interpreted phrase, interpretation 
against the wording, and silence on the part of the legislator7.  
To start with, argument from legislative materials is invoked as 
a justification of choice from among several possible interpretations of 
a text. This usage will be characteristic for solving the problem of 
ambiguity of legal texts: "Since the linguistic interpretation of this 
phrase does not lead to an unambiguous meaning, the ratio legis of the 
amended provision under interpretation must be determined (...)."8 
Using legislative history in order to choose from among several 
interpretation hypotheses appears to be the least controversial usage of 
this tool9. The choice has to be made when the interpreter is dealing 
with ambiguous wording of a provision of law10 or with the so-called 
                                                                 
7 This has been discussed more broadly in Bielska – Brodziak 2017: chapter 5. 
8 The Supreme Court further used the explanatory statement to the governmental draft 
of the bill, see Cf. Supreme Court resolution of 26 April 2017, I KZP 7/07, OSNKW 
2007/5/38. See also Solan (2005: 484). 
9 That said, the scholars are not unanimous even about the admissibility of this usage – 
see a comparison of views held by Scalia and Breyer on the acceptable ways of using 
legislative history in the interpretation of law described by Mammen (2002: 155 et seq., 
169 et seq.) 
10 A frequent problem when a choice has to be made is a conflict between the so-called 
"plain" meanings, inferred from the general ("colloquial") language, "In a case where 
various provisions of the text suggest two completely different «plain» meanings, a tie-
breaking device is necessary . Legislative history can be such a device (…)" – Zeppos  
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classification11. Whenever this is the case, referring to legislative 
materials makes it possible to select one of several meanings of a legal 
text and reject the other ones.  
Secondly, legislative history is often employed to confirm a line 
of interpretation12. In many judgments, this argument merely serves to 
strengthen and provide a better justification for an interpretation 
hypothesis, or to ensure that it is correct13. Nevertheless, the confirming 
function of parliamentary documents is not limited to merely 
strengthening argumentation for a specific, previously selected 
interpretation hypothesis. In fact, it frequently becomes a litmus paper 
for clarity as in many cases a prima facie unambiguous text, once it has 
been analysed in the context of its legislative history, loses its clarity14. 
The third way of using legislative materials is the so-called 
supplementation. The justification for this function of legislative 
materials is the conviction that the legislator has included in them a 
number of hints for the interpreters – for instance hints on how to 
construe details which have not been expressly set out in the text – and 
so they can be treated as a vehicle for conveying these additional details 
(Gluck and Bressman 2013: 973). In order to correctly interpret a text, 
one sometimes needs to simply supplement it with these details. The 
most recognised category of problems where interpreters recourse to 
                                                                 
(1990:1328). In Polish literature on ambiguity in law see Gizbert -Studnicki 1978. More 
recently, important observations, from an intentionalist position, have been presented 
by Tobor (2013: 153-189). 
11 This is an interpretation situation in which the interpreter must decide whether a case 
is an element of a specific legal category (e.g. the famous American case, where it had 
to be determined whether a tomato is a vegetable or a fruit, and the decision was 
important for the level of taxation to be applied). Naturally, this decision entails that 
certain effects, as provided for by the law, will or will not be applied. On classification 
as a separate type of interpretation situations, see Tobor (2013: 213-223); Grabowski 
1997: 85-89. In foreign literature, see MacCormick (1978: 95-97 and 147-148). 
12 The confirmatory function of legislative materials has been analysed in Brudney 
(2011: 901 et seq). 
13 Judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Krakow of 28 November 2013, 
I SA/Kr 1222/13, LEX No. 1485017. Other examples of judgments: judgment of the  
Voivodeship Administrative Court in Krakow of 6 June 2013, I SA/Kr 1903/12, LEX 
No. 1333935; judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court in Warsaw of 26 
February 2013, I FSK 491/12, LEX No. 1354026. 
14 On how a text's clarity and ambiguity depends on the context see Mammen (2002: 
33-37); Nourse (2014: 1650 et seq). 
 
 
Comparative Legilinguistics 2018/34 
15 
 
legislative history in order to "supplement" the meaning is vagueness15. 
The job of the interpreter is then to decide whether a case he or she is 
considering can be qualified as a vague expression (in other words, 
whether it falls within the meaning of vagueness)16.  
The fourth situation where lawyers recourse to legislative 
materials is when they interpret against the wording. This encompasses 
cases when the linguistic meaning of a legal text is clear, however the 
interpreter rejects it, and decides in defiance of it (in such cases 
decisions are taken based on a meaning which contradicts the wording 
of a provision, and which does not follow from the letter of the law). 
Interpretation against the wording is in fact correcting, amending, and 
refining the text of an act through interpretation. Therefore, the 
interpreter accepts fiction and decides as if the wording of the act was 
different. The justification for the need to break from the literal meaning 
is usually the conviction that the legislator made a mistake when 
drawing up the act, as a result of which following the linguistic meaning 
would lead to absurd, flagrantly unjust or otherwise unacceptable 
consequences. One of the judgments reads as follows:  
 
an unintentional legislative error took place, causing a gap in the 
provision (...) as a result of which application of the norm 
derived  from the literal wording of the provision is 
unacceptable as it manifestly contradicts the principle of 
reasonableness and equity.17 
 
This is arguably the most interesting category of uses of 
legislative materials. Derogations from the linguistic meaning are the 
most controversial interpretation situations and, considering the 
uncertainty that they entail, raise concerns among the addressees of the 
decision implementing the law18. In the light of the deeply ingrained 
                                                                 
15 Given that there is an extensive literature on vagueness, I shall only refer to selected 
publications: Greenawalt (2001: 433 et seq.); Edincott (2011: 14-30); Jónsson  (2009: 
193-214). 
16 For instance, whether a case of negligence can be considered as "gross", or whether 
some remuneration can be considered as "excessive", etc. For more details on this,  
Łętowska (201: 17). 
17 Cf. Supreme Court resolution of 25 February 2009, I KZP 39/08 
18 This is especially the case when breaking from the literal meaning causes negative 
consequences for the citizen.  
 
 
Agnieszka Bielska-Brodziak, Karolina Paluszek: Legislative history... 
16 
 
belief that the limits of the law are defined by "the four corners of a 
sheet of paper"19, such manifest cases of derogating from the letter of 
the law attract attention of both interpretation practitioners and legal 
scholars specialising in interpretation20. If breaking from the literal 
meaning is inevitable, it appears that legislative materials ought to 
provide the strongest justification for the decision to do so: the context 
created by legislative history, which comes directly from the legislator, 
seems to best justify departing from the imperfect language of the act.  
It is also worth adding that legislative materials are used in case 
of silence on the part of the legislator. The legislator's silence, or the 
absence of a clear wording of an issue in a legal act, is always 
performative and entails interpretation consequences. Legislative 
materials are used to determine whether the legislator purposefully or 
accidently did not include some wording in the text of an act, and as a 
result, to attribute meaning to this silence21.  
2.3. The role of legislative materials in Polish 
interpretative paradigm in Polish literature and 
decision-making practice 
Poland has not introduced, either statutorily or through established 
interpretation directives, any rules for using legislative materials. 
Therefore, there are no directives requiring or prohibiting using them. 
As a general rule, the Polish legal tradition has allowed the use of any 
and all materials which may prove useful in the course of interpretation 
of the law, although it is obvious that some interpretation tools will be 
more culturally valued and recommended than others. The use of 
                                                                 
19 Z. Tobor (2013: 232) indicates, however, that "contemporary textualists have given 
up the conviction that meaning can be determined within the four corners of a legal 
text". See also C. Nelson (2005: 368-369). 
20 Opponents of breaking from the literal wording of an act maintain that acts ought to 
be construed in line with their plain or conventional meanings, and – in the event of a 
conflict of meanings – the plain, linguistic meaning ought to prevail over other possible 
interpretations – B. Bix (1996: 132). 
21 A number of highly interesting cases illustrating different situations where legislative 
materials were used have been described in my monograph (Bielska-Brodziak 2017). 
The Readers may want to look them up.  
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travaux preparatoires in the process of interpretation of the law has, 
until recently, only received marginal interest in the Polish literature , 
and yet – as shown by the analyses conducted above – their popularity 
in judicial decision making surprises by its scale. It is beyond any doubt 
that legislative materials are currently an important and increasingly 
used interpretation tool. It should be emphasised that this is partly due 
to the fact that over the past few years the conditions of using legislative 
materials have significantly improved owing to free, relatively easy and 
convenient access via the Internet.  
3. Interpretation of EU law 
3.1 Introduction – specificities of EU legal order 
influencing the courts’ approach towards legislative 
history22 
As was the case with Poland, the role of legislative history in the EU 
context did not attract the attention of a vast majority of legal scholars. 
The usefulness of various tools of historical interpretation (proposals 
and drafts of legal acts, minutes from consultation proceedings, but also 
amendments and changes to the enacted legislation) for interpretation 
of European law context tends to be questioned, without a 
comprehensive analysis of the issue. Several reasons for the marginal 
importance of historical interpretation have been pointed out by N. 
Reich (2004: 26-27): 
1. The complexity and length of the EU legislation procedure; 
2. Rich diversity of national legal traditions in the EU. 
                                                                 
22 The research presented in this paper is part of the project: "Linguistic comparison as 
an interpretative tool of the Court of Justice of the European Union", financed by the 
Polish National Science Centre (agreement no. UMO-2014/13/N/HS5/01278). A more 
complex analysis of linguistic comparison within historical interpretation has been 
presented as part of doctoral thesis of K. Paluszek, written in Polish, entitled 
"Komparatystyka językowa jako narzędzie interpretacyjne Trybunału Sprawiedliwości 
Unii Europejskiej), Katowice 2017, yet unpublished (see chapter IV)  
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Prohibition of using declarations of the Commission or Council 
in interpretation against the wording of the interpreted provision, 
derived from the EU case law The marginal use of historical 
interpretation remains in line with the ECJ case law, according to which 
the use of historical interpretation, and above all legislative materials, 
is subject to significant limitations23. The Court points out that the 
reference to the course of the legislative process cannot lead to an 
interpretation which is contrary to the wording of the interpreted 
provision24. Although the acceptance of such “linguistic borders” of 
interpretation raises serious doubts25 (especially with regard to the 
extensive advocacy for the adoption of the principle of dynamic 
interpretation, which assumes a widespread use of non-textual 
directives of interpretation), it should be admitted that the usage of the 
legislative history does not play a crucial role in the judicial practice of 
the CJEU. However, the growing importance of historical arguments 
has been noticed in literature - K. Lenaerts and J.A. Gutiérrez-Fons 
(2013: 24), S. Schønberg and K. Frick (2003: 149) as well as S. 
Miettinen and M. Kettunen (2005). S. Schønberg and K. Frick (2003: 
149) distinguish different reasons for the change of attitude of the CJEU 
towards travaux preparatoires (influence of national legal traditions of 
member states, complex and technical nature of interpreted acts, 
improving quality and accessibility of legislative materials). 
This article does not aim to present a comprehensive analysis 
of the use of historical arguments by the Court of Justice. Instead, it 
focuses on displaying some original features of the EU law (in 
comparison with national, often monolingual legislation) that can 
contribute to a greater usefulness of legislative materials in the process 
of its interpretation. 
                                                                 
23 Judgment of the Court of 23.02. 1988 r. in case 429/85 Commission v Italy, Rec. 
p. 843, point. 9  and Judgment of the Court of 10.01.2006 in case C- 402/03 Skov Æg 
v Bilka Lavprisvarehus A/S and Bilka Lavprisvarehus A/S v Jette Mikkelsen and 
Michael Due Nielsen (ECLI:EU:C:2006:6) point 42.  Such position remains also in 
accordance with the legal culture of common law countries – see Bielska-Brodziak 
(2012: 144-154). 
24 Judgment of the Court of 26.02.1991r. in case c-292/89 The Queen v Immigration 
Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Gustaff Desiderius Antonissen (ECLI:EU:C:1991:80), 
point 18 
25 It has been stated that such "linguistic borders" of the interpretation do not exist - see 
A. Bielska-Brodziak 2006, Spyra 2006, Tobor (2010: 194-201).  
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a. The lawmakers’ participation in proceedings before the CJEU 
Unlike by national legislation, the reconstruction of the course of 
legislative works in case of the EU law is facilitated by the fact that the 
EU legislative bodies have the right to participate in proceedings before 
the Court. In most direct action proceedings, the EU institutions 
(including its legislative bodies and the Commission, which owns the 
legislative initiative) are parties. Additionally, in preliminary 
proceedings, under Art. 23 of the Statute of the CJEU, an institution, 
body, office or agency of the Union which adopted an act the validity 
or interpretation of which is in dispute (as well as the Commission), 
shall be entitled to submit to the Court written pleadings or written 
observations26. A similar provision is contained in the Rules of 
Procedure of the Court (Article 96§1), according to which the 
institution which issued the act, validity or interpretation of which is the 
subject of the dispute, may also be involved in the preliminary ruling 
proceedings.  
Therefore, it is possible to confront various views on the course 
of legislative work and the presumed intentions of the legislator with 
the view of the institutions that actually worked on the interpreted act 
(both at the proposal stage and on the finally adopted project). 
As regards the interpretation of primary law, it should be noted that 
unlike the secondary EU legislation, primary law includes international 
agreements concluded between the Member States. Consequently, not 
only the EU Institutions but also the Member States are involved in the 
process of drafting and changing them. Thus, in the case of primary 
legislation, there are more entities involved in the legislative process. 
Member States are also involved in proceedings before the Court 
(where they can act as parties or intervene on a similar basis as EU 
institutions). Nevertheless, the multiplicity of actors involved in the 
adoption and amendment of primary legislation, as well as the 
                                                                 
26 Consolidated text annexed to the Treaties of the Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union, as amended by Regulation (EU, Euratom) of 
the European Parliament and of the Council No 741/2012 of 11 August 2012 (OJ L 1) 
and Article 9 of the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Republic of 
Croatia and the adjustments to the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community (OJ L112 of 24.4.2012 21). 
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differences in the interests they represent, make it more difficult (in 
comparison to secondary legislation) to obtain clear information about 
the course of the legislative process and the intention of the lawmaker 
in proceedings before the ECJ. Using arguments based on the legislative 
history in the interpretation of primary law is further complicated by the 
fact that initially the preparatory works were not preserved. This was 
pointed out by Advocate General Kokott in her opinion in case C-
583/11, where she noted a significant turning point in recourse to 
historical directives in the interpretation process: 
 
Drafting history in particular has not played a role thus far 
in the interpretation of primary law, because the ‘travaux 
préparatoires’ for the founding Treaties were largely not 
available. However, the practice of using conventions to prepare 
Treaty amendments, like the practice of publishing the mandates 
of intergovernmental conferences, has led to a fundamental 
change in this area. The greater transparency in the 
preparations for Treaty amendments opens up new 
possibilities for interpreting the Treaties which should be 
utilised as supplementary means of interpretation if, as in 
the present case, the meaning of a provision is still unclear 
having regard to its wording, the regulatory context and the 
objectives pursued. 27 
 
As is clear from this passage, reference to the course of the 
legislative process may be relevant in situations where the interpretative 
problem concerns primary law. A similar role of legislative materials 
can be observed in the interpretation of secondary law. Even accepting 
the prohibition of an interpretation contrary to the wording (which is 
significantly weakened by multilingualism) does not mean that 
legislative materials cannot be used at all in the course of interpretation, 
for example initiating the process or supporting the result obtained by 
other interpretative methods. 
                                                                 
27 Opinion of Advocate general J. Kokott delivered on 17.01.2013 in case C-583/11 P 
Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union (ECLI:EU:C:2013:21) point 32 
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b. Multilingualism – a new chance for historical 
arguments  
Multilingualism is a feature of the EU law which has a significant 
impact on how the traditional interpretative methods and directives are 
used. Linguistic comparison comprises an analysis and collation of the 
wording of the contested provision of law in the official languages of 
the EU. It is often regarded as a part of textual analysis of the wording 
of contested provision (Wróbel 2010: 329, Kalisz 2007: 158, Barcik and 
Wentkowska 2014: 310, Kalisz 2011: 197)28. It reveals divergences 
between various language versions that have to be reconciled by non-
textual methods of interpretation (first of all teleological and systemic). 
Historical interpretation has not been mentioned as useful in solving 
problems resulting from multilingualism. However, the multilingua l 
nature of the EU law opens new possibilities for using this 
underestimated interpretative tool. Additionally, linguistic comparison, 
combined with historical arguments, may not only be regarded as a 
source of interpretative doubts, but also as a valuable instrument in 
finding a solution. 
The link between historical interpretation and multilingua lism 
is evident in the comparison of the multilingual wording of the 
historical versions of the interpreted legal act or related regulations, as 
well as in the use of the chronology of the formation of individua l 
language versions in the course of interpretation.  
As previously shown, the Court has formulated a prohibition on using 
the course of the legislative process for interpretation contrary to the 
wording of the provision, which constitutes the limit to the use of 
historical arguments in the interpretation (albeit raises the previously 
stated doubts). Moreover, multilingualism of the EU law can also 
seriously limit the possibility of interpretation "contrary to the 
wording". Thus, in case of as many as 24 available language versions, 
the inconsistency of the interpretation with one version does not 
necessarily conflict with the other versions. 
In addition, multilingualism makes it possible to compare the 
wording of proposals as well as the successive changes of interpreted 
                                                                 
28 However, M. Zirk-Sadowski (2012: 371) classifies "linguistic comparison" as a 
systemic directive of interpretation. 
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provisions in different language versions of proposals or already 
enacted legal acts, which constitutes another valuable material used in 
the interpretation of the EU law alongside other interpretative tools. In 
the context of multilingualism, there is a particular argument that can 
be included in the broadly understood history of legislation. While 
legislative work can be carried out parallel in many languages, so that 
it is impossible to distinguish between drafting and translation of law 
(co-drafting)29, it is important to realise that this only applies to 
language versions authentic at the time of legislative work. However, 
the number of official languages of the EU, and thus the authentic 
languages of its legislation, is constantly changing (it has grown so far 
as with each EU enlargement, and could now hypothetically decrease 
as a result of the planned Brexit). 
Consequently, in spite of accepted fictions, as described in 
literature (Doczekalska 2009: 359), and first of all despite treating all 
versions as equal originals, some language versions are inevitably 
secondary – resulting from the increase in the number of official 
languages of the EU as an effect of subsequent enlargements. It has 
been stated in the doctrine that the Court actually takes also those 
"subsequent" versions into consideration, ignoring the chronology of 
drafting particular versions30. Nevertheless, this statement does not 
seem to be illustrative of a general rule of rejection of chronology in the 
CJEU. On the contrary, the recent case law does not confirm the 
existence of obstacles in using the chronological arguments in cases 
decided by the CJEU. Consequently, in the course of proceedings a 
party, advocate general or the Court can refer to the wording of the 
"original language versions" existing at the time of the adoption or entry 
into force of the interpreted act. And although it is fair to believe that 
referring to the chronological priority of the language versions is 
contrary to the accepted principle of equal authenticity of all language 
versions, and above all the theory of original texts (according to which 
                                                                 
29 A. Doczekalska (2009: 359), referring to works of T. Gallas and M. Guggeis points 
out that the term "co-drafting" has been used in description of legislative proposal’s 
verification conducted by lawyer-linguists (Doczekalska 2009: 359). The same author 
analyses various co-drafting techniques (2009: 116-135). 
30 A. Doczekalska (2006: 19) provides an example of Judgment of the Court of 
24.10.1996 in case C-72/95 Aannemersbedrijf P.K. Kraaijeveld BV e.a. v Gedeputeerde 
Staten van Zuid-Holland. 
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all versions are treated as equal originals, and should be considered in 
course of interpretation even if they did not exist at the time of passing 
the interpreted act), this specific kind of historical considerations 
actually takes place in the CJEU adjudication process. 
It should be emphasised that not only the wording of the 
judgment in a particular case matters for understanding the process of 
interpretation of the EU law, but also the advocate general’s opinion, 
containing an analysis of the case and a proposal of the solution with a 
comprehensive justification prepared by a judge-like member of the 
Court. The final decision often remains in line with the opinion, but the 
justification is rather shorter and focuses on the main arguments, 
whereas others are summarized or passed over in silence. Therefore, 
also the opinions should be regarded as a valuable source of 
argumentation for the interpretative choices of the Court. 
3.2.Ways of using legislative materials by the Court of 
Justice 
Both aforementioned specific features of the EU law and adjudication 
process imply the different role of historical arguments in the course of 
interpretation (in comparison to the national legal system, where it is 
rather impossible to deal with more than twenty equally authentic 
language versions and to have the lawmaker represented in the 
proceedings). Therefore, it can be difficult to classify the roles that 
legislative history can play in categories proposed for the Polish law. 
As the purposive approach plays a crucial role in EU legal 
interpretation, we rather look for the lawmaker's intent instead of 
sticking to the meaning of particular words (especially dealing with 
many inequivalent words in different languages). However, the 
lawmaker's aim is usually articulated in the recitals to the legal act 
(rarely found in national legal acts), so it may be unnecessary to look 
into the act’s proposal or its justification.  
Of course in some cases the advocate general’s opinion or the 
judgment contains references to the intention derived from travaux 
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preparatoires31 – in such cases their use does not differ much from how 
they are used in Poland. 
Additionally, the lawmaker's attendance at the Court 
proceedings gives him the chance to explain his intent – as to what the 
lawmaker wanted to say and to achieve – and it may lead to reference 
to legislative history. In this way participants make use of the 
explanatory value of travaux preparatoires. For example, in case C-
193/11 the Commission stated that the text of the French language 
version to the interpreted directive was actually discussed and accepted 
by all member States32. It should be emphasised that, unlike in national 
settings, the core issue in raising such arguments is not the aim of the 
lawmaker or explaining the meaning of a specific unclear term, but 
rather the way to persuade the Court to reconcile the divergences 
between various authentic language versions in favour of the informal 
original. Similarly, the Court or advocate general do not search for the 
explanation of meaning of particular words in the way that national 
courts do. They rather try to determine which language versions and 
which words have been used in the course of the legislative procedure. 
This is a pre-step taking place before considerations of the meaning of 
disputed provision. It aims to identify what was originally said before 
the process of multiple translations started.  
3.3 Interpretative situations, the role of historical 
arguments and their value for the final solution 
The interpretative situations in legal interpretation are similar 
regardless of the legal system. However, in a multilingual setting, one 
additional feature must be considered that is the diverging language 
versions, often containing expressions of different meaning and scope. 
Therefore, the most important issue is the comparative analysis of 
                                                                 
31 See for example interesting considerations on the lawmaker’s intention based on an 
analysis of travaux preparatoires (comparison of proposal and final text of the 
interpreted directive), presented by Advocate General P. Mengozzi in his opinion from 
24.10.2012 in case c-409/11 Csonka and others v. Magyar Állam 
(ECLI:EU:C:2012:660), pp. 30-32 
32 Judgment of the Court from 26.09.2013 in case C-193/11 European Commission 
against Republic of Poland (ECLI:EU:C:2013:608, point 15) 
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different wordings that are supposed to mean the same thing. The single 
expressions may be ambiguous or vague, but they must be considered 
as constituting the same, equal legal provision. This issue of 
inconsistency might be recognised as a specific type of ambiguity or 
classification problem (as the particular versions often contain words of 
different scope). The situation of vagueness is less common.  
The next function of legislative history arguments observed in 
Polish judgments, namely interpretation contrary to the wording is not 
so obvious to determine, as we deal with more than one text. As has 
already been stated, the legal interpretation of multilingual law requires 
taking into consideration different language versions of the interpreted 
act. In case of the EU law, we rather deal with inconsistent language 
versions than with interpretation contrary to the wording (that must 
consequently have been contrary to all, often diverging language 
versions). And even if such use of legislative history could be 
considered (with the aforementioned limitations), the stable position of 
the CJEU presented at the beginning suggests a rather weak chance for 
success of such argumentation. 
The function of legislative history also differs from categories 
distinguished for the Polish adjudication process. The similar feature is 
that in many cases legislative history does not serve as the only or key 
interpretative tool but rather supports other arguments. But as has 
already been explained, legislative history serves rather at the beginning 
of the process of interpretation to limit the scope of further analysis and 
provide supplementary arguments than to verify the results of other 
interpretative methods33.  
For instance, the time of origin of each language version 
influenced the range of linguistic comparison (number of versions 
tested) conducted by advocate general in case c-359/12 Timmel. In her 
opinion in Case c-359/12 Timmel, Advocate General E. Sharpston 
stated: 
At the time when the Prospectus Directive entered into force 
(on 31 December 2003) there were 15 Member States and 11 official 
languages. In 10 of those languages the word ‘and’ is used in Article 
                                                                 
33 Nevertheless, such verifying role can sometimes be observed, see opinion of advocate 
general P. Cruz Villalón from 06.10.2015  in joined cases c-443/14 and C-444/14 Kreis 
Warendorf v. Ibrahim Alo  and Amir Osso v. Region Hannover 
(ECLI:EU:C:2015:665), point 49. 
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14(2)(b) of the Prospectus Directive. The word ‘or’ is used only in the 
German version of the text.34  
Surprisingly, after that short analysis (reported only in the 
footnote), the advocate general made reference to the need to compare 
all language versions (confirmed in the CJEU case law). The quoted 
passage shows that the moment of entry into force of the interpreted 
Directive has been used to limit the scope of linguistic comparison. 
Only versions existing in December 2013 have been examined, despite 
indications by the Advocate General, that all the language versions 
should be considered. In addition to the quantitative argument 
(interpretation in accordance with most language versions), the 
Advocate General referred to the scheme and purpose of the legislation 
at issue.  
The Court shared the conclusions of Advocate General, 
stressing her teleological considerations35. However, in justification of 
the final decision, the Court did not refer to linguistic comparison and 
did not use quantitative arguments nor chronology of the formation of 
the various language versions. 
In some disputes the chronology of the formation of the various 
language versions has been used both in the opinion of the Advocate 
General and in the Court’s judgment. In case Confédération paysanne36 
Advocate General J. Kokott had analyzed the meaning of all 11 original 
language versions of the interpreted Regulation, indicating the 
interpretation possibilities arising from the various versions. It should 
be emphasised that the opinion was written in May 2013, when the EU 
had 23 official languages - and all 23 versions of the interpreted act 
were equally authentic. However, the AG based her arguments only on 
the 11 versions, existing at the time of adoption of the interpreted act. 
She showed similarity of all examined language versions (despite the 
use of different formulations), with the exception of one. The observed 
similarity of all the original versions (except the French) then gave rise 
                                                                 
34 Opinion of Advocate General E. Sharpston delivered on  26.11.2013 in case c-359/12 
Michael Timmel v Aviso Zeta AG (ECLI:EU:C:2013:783), footnote 50. 
35 Judgment of the Court of 15.05.2014 in case c-359/12 Michael Timmel v Aviso Zeta 
AG (ECLI:EU:C:2014:325), point 63. 
36 Opinion of Advocate General J. Kokott delivered on 16.05.2013 in case C-298/12 
Confédération paysanne v Ministre de l’alimentation, de l’agriculture et de la pêche 
(ECLI:EU:C:2013:319). 
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to searching for traces of the intentions of the legislator in legislative 
materials, systematics, and aim of the regulation. Analysing the course 
of the legislative process, the Advocate General pointed out that the 
discrepancies in the language already existed at the proposal stage (in 
the Commission). Consequently, the legislative materials, although 
they did not resolve doubts, provided an indication of the legislator’s 
intent. Further teleological and axiological considerations37 led the 
Advocate General to the formulation of proposals for resolving the 
dispute. The Court shared the conclusions of the AG, conducting an 
even more detailed analysis of the legislative work, systematics and the 
preamble to the contested regulation38. Therefore, the historical 
argument served in the initial phase and was further supported by other 
means of interpretation. Together with the quantitative argument it 
might be seen as a valuable help to choose from different interpretative 
possibilities, similar to the previously explained national practice.  
4. Conclusions 
The usage of legislative history in interpretation of the EU and Polish 
national law differs significantly. 
1. In Polish judgments two different roles of historical arguments can 
be distinguished – sometimes they are used to determine the 
lawmaker’s intent and in other cases they serve to explain the 
meaning of particular expressions. In contrast, in the CJEU 
legislative history is often employed to establish the language 
version that has been subject to legislative works and negotiations 
or to distinguish between unofficial originals and subsequent 
language versions. 
2. Moreover, in interpretation of the EU legislation the travaux 
preparatoires serve rather at the beginning of the whole process, 
                                                                 
37 Opinion of Advocate General J. Kokott delivered on 16.05.2013 in case C-298/12 
Confédération paysanne v Ministre de l’alimentation, de l’agriculture et de la pêche 
(ECLI:EU:C:2013:319), points 25-34 
38 Judgment of the Court of 3.10.2013 in case C-298/12 Confédération paysanne v 
Ministre de l’Alimentation, de l’Agriculture et de la Pêche (ECLI:EU:C:2013:630), 
points 21-34 
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determining the scope of further linguistic analyses and supporting 
other argumentation, whereas in Poland they can play five different 
roles, from verifying and supplementing other arguments up to 
decisive function in cases of interpretation against the wording. The 
latter is less possible in the multilingual EU reality, where the 
existence of many language versions of the interpreted act 
significantly weakens the possibility of achieving interpretation 
incompatible with the wording (due to the multiplicity of 
alternative understandings of the disputed expression, consistent 
with at least one authentic language version).  
3. The analysis of the relation between linguistic comparison and 
arguments based on history of legislation shows that 
multilingualism of EU law implies the increasing interest of the 
Court of Justice in historical method of interpretation.  
4. Changes in the number of official EU languages imply the 
possibility to refer to the chronology of the formation of following 
language versions of the interpreted act, which in some cases leads 
to a limitation of the scope of the linguistic comparison. In other 
cases the compatibility of chosen interpretation with the original 
language versions serves as an argument in favour of the final 
decision. 
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